

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 02751 01 OF 02 171122Z

12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 170932Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4595

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 2751

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, IR, TUNX MARR

SUBJECT: BHUTTO DISCUSS POSSIBLE PAK-IRANIAN-TURKISH SECURITY
ALLIANCE

1. BHUTTO ASKED THAT I CALL ON HIM LAST EVENING (AZIZ AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI WERE ALSO PRESENT). HE SAID HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT PROJECT ON WHICH HE WAS WORKING. HE WOULD AVOID FOR THE PRESENT MEETING THE RESONING, WITH ALL OF ITS RAMIFICATIONS, THAT LAY BEHIND HIS THINKING, AND GO STRAIGHT TO THE PROJECT ITSELF. HE SAID WE COULD GET TOGETHER SOMEWHAT LATER ON WHEN HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DEVELOP HIS THINKING IN DETAIL. FOR THE PRESENT HE WOULD ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT I WANTED TO ASK.

2. BHUTTO SAID THAT WHEN THE SHAH VISITED HIM IN LARKANA LAST YEAR HE, THE PM, HAD BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE SECURITY ALLIANCE BETWEEN PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY ALONG THE LINES OF THE PRESENT SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY. HE SAID AT THAT TIME HE DID NOT GET INTO SPECIFICS BUT JUST ASKED THE SHAH TO "CHEW OVER THE GENERAL PROPOSITION" FOR DISCUSSION AT SOME FUTURE TIME. HE SAID INDEED HE HAD NOT AT THAT TIME THOUGHT THROUGH ALL OF THE VARIOUS MODULATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS THAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED, I.E. HOW IT MESHEDED WITH CENTO, WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD BE AN EXTENSION OF THE PRESENT RCD, ETC.

3. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD TALKED IN LIKE VEIN TO THE TURKISH PRESIDENT
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WHEN HE VISITED HERE AND ALSO TO THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER.

LATER ON IN LAHORE IN JANUARY THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL. WHEN AZIZ AHMED VISITED IRAN IN DECEMBER HE TALKED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAYING THAT BHUTTO WOULD LIKE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT WHEN THE SHAH PAID HIS VISIT HERE.

4. BHUTTO SAID THAT DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF THE SHAH THERE HAD BEEN MUCH EARNEST DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT. HE TOLD THE SHAH THAT HE COULD SEE MANY BENEFITS FROM SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, NOT ONLY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE THREE NATIONS THEMSELVES, BUT EVEN FROM A WIDER POINT OF VIEW. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN TALKED ABOUT IN THEIR FORMAL MEETINGS, AND THAT IT WAS VERY MUCH A SUBJECT JUST BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM DURING THEIR TALKS IN RAWALPINDI, LAHORE AND LARKANA. HE SAID AT THE END OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS HE THOUGHT THEY HAD REACHED A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH DETAILS HAD STILL NOT BEEN FORMULATED. THEY HAD BOTH AGREED TO GIVE THE MATTER VERY SERIOUS ATTENTION AND DISCUSS IT AT LENGTH AGAIN, AND WITH THE TURKS, WHEN THEY MEET AT THE RCD SUMMIT IN APRIL.

5. BHUTTO SAID THE SHAH WAS IN A SERIOUS MOOD AS REGARDS THE SECURITY PROSPECTS FOR THE AREA, AND THAT HE REPEATED MANY MANY TIMES THAT PAKISTAN MIGHT WELL BE THE FIRST TO FALL INTO REAL TROUBLE, AND THEN THE TARGET WOULD BE IRAN. THEY WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A PRIMARY TARGET AREA FOR MOSCOW. THEY REALIZED THEY COULD OF COURSE NOT BUILD SUFFICIENT ARMED STRENGTH TO WITHSTAND THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER SINGLY OR JOINTLY, FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. THEY FELT, HOWEVER, THAT BY JOINING TOGETHER THEY COULD CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD BE HIGHLY BENEFICIAL FROM A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW THAT WOULD ENHANCE THE ATMOSPHERE OF SECURITY AND PROMOTE A CLIMATE MORE CONDUCTIVE TO INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH UPON WHICH STRENGTH MUST ULTIMATELY DEPEND. THEY ALSO FELT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THE THREE JOINING TOGETHER SHOULD BE BENEFICIAL FROM A BROADER POINT OF VIEW AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE AREA TO STAND TOGETHER AGAINST THE AMBITIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BHUTTO REPEATED AGAIN THAT THEY COULD DEVOTE MORE TIME TO ALL OF THIS IN OUR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS.

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6. BHUTTO SAID THE SHAH HAD ONE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION, WHICH HE RETURNED TO MANY TIMES IN THEIR DISCUSSION, ASKING OVER AND OVER AGAIN WHETHER IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE ON THEIR PART WOULD RESULT IN ANY INTERRUPTION IN THE FREE FLOW OF U.S. MILITARY ARMS TO IRAN. BHUTTO SAID HE FELT INSTINCTIVELY THAT HE KNEW THE ANSWER TO THAT BUT DID NOT TRY TO BE DEFINITIVE, AS ONLY THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER.

HE SUGGESTED THAT THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE OBTAINED DIRECTLY ON THE MATTER.

7. THE SECOND QUESTION RAISED BY THE SHAH WAS WHETHER THE PACT SHOULD NOT INITIALLY HAVE A BROADER BASE. HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ AND PERHAPS OTHER PERSIAN GULF STATES. BHUTTO SAID HE REPLIED THAT HE FELT IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER TO START THIS PROCESS WITH JUST TURKEY, IRAN AND PAKISTAN, OR IF THE TURKS HAD TOO MANY PROBLEMS AT THE MOMENT, WITH JUST IRAN AND PAKISTAN. HE SAID OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE SUCH DELAY AND DOUBT, OR POSSIBLY TURNDOWN, THAT THESE WOULD PREVENT THE PROJECT FROM GETTING LAUNCHED IN A STRAIGHT-FORWARD DRAMATIC MANNER. HE SAID IF THIS NUCLEUS COULD BE FORMED, AND IF IT PROVED AN ATTRACTION, PERHAPS IN TIME OTHER NATIONS WOULD ACCEPT THEIR THINKING AND WANT TO JOIN, WHICH WOULD BE A MUCH MORE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

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P 170932Z MAR 76
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4596

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 2751

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND ATHERTON

8. BHUTTO PAUSED FOR MY COMMENTS. I TOLD HIM I JUST COULD NOT HELP BUT THINK IN TERMS OF HISTORY ON THIS ONE. HOW MUCH WE HAD HOPED IN THE EARLY 50'S TO HEAR THE THINGS HE WAS SAYING FROM A TURK, AND IRANIAN OR A PAKISTANI. WE HAD ALWAYS FELT THAT THESE THREE NATIONS SHOULD BE THE KEY BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE AREA. THIS HAD BEEN THE BASIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES "NORTHERN TIER" SPEECH JUST AFTER HE RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO THE AREA IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION. THE IMPETUS AT THAT TIME UNFORTUNATELY HAD HAD TO COME FROM US, BUT WE DID

TAKE THE LEAD FOR THE VERY POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS HE HAD ADVANCED. OUR FEELING AT THAT TIME WAS THAT SUCH A MOVE COULD ENHANCE THE GENERAL FEELING OF SECURITY IN THE AREA THAT WOULD LEAD TOWARDS A GROWTH OF STRENGTH. LISTENING TO IT NOW, FROM ONE OF THE KEY LEADERS IN THE AREA, GAVE ME GREAT PERSONAL SATISFACTION. I SAID THESE WERE ALL PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND I WOULD MAKE NO EFFORT TO SPEAK FOR MY GOVERNMENT WITHOUT GUIDANCE ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER.

9. I ASKED IF HE COULD CLARIFY ANY FURTHER WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THE SHAH'S MIND BY MAKING HIM QUESTION WHETHER SUCH A STEP MIGHT INTERRUPT HIS ACCESS TO U.S. MILITARY SUPPLIES. BHUTTO SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN, AS HE HAD THOUGHT IT MIGHT EVEN BE A BASIS FOR US TO BE MORE POSITIVE. I TOLD HIM I WAS PUZZLED ON THIS AS WELL AND COULD ONLY WONDER WHETHER HE WAS THINKING OF OUR SHORT TERM DIFFICULTIES WITH TURKEY. SPEAKING IN A PERSONAL VEIN AGAIN, I TOLD HIM I WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT HE HAD
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GIVEN THE SHAH GOOD ADVICE AS REGARDS HIS SECOND POINT ON BROADENING THE ALLIANCE. I SAID WE OURSELVES, IN EARLIER DAYS, HAD HOPED THAT AN ALLIANCE COULD START WITH THE THREE KEY STATES IN THE AREA. THIS MIGHT IN TIME LEAD OTHERS TO JOIN, OR AT THE MINIMUM, LOOSELY TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE PACT. I SAID I ALSO THOUGHT AN EARLY ACTION BY AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO HOPE FOR.

10. BHUTTO SAID THAT IT ALL WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE EASY. IF HE PUT IT COLD TO HIS CABINET HE WOULD GUESS HE WOULD GET ONLY TWO AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. HE SAID IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLD TO THE PEOPLE AS A VERY POSITIVE AND GOOD STEP FOR THEIR OWN WELL BEING AND SECURITY. AS A POLITICIAN HE WOULD HAVE TO SPEAK OUT FAR MORE THAN HE HAD DONE UP TO NOW. IN SPEAKING ABOUT THE REALITIES OF SECURITY IN THE AREA HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HIS PEOPLE COULD TAKE NO COMFORT IN "DETENTE" BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS. HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A PUBLIC STANCE MORE COMPATIBLE WITH HIS ONW INCREASING CONCERNS ABOUT THE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID I MUST KNOW THEY WERE INCREASING, OR HE NEVER WOULD HAVE TALKED TO FIRYUBIN AS HE HAD ON HIS RECENT VISIT HERE (EMBTel 2638). HE SAID HE KNEW THE SHAH ALSO FELT THE SAME WAY.

11. I ASKED HOW FAR THEY HAD GOTTEN WITH THE TURKS. BHUTTO SAID HE THOUGHT THE TURKS WERE TAKING IT SERIOUSLY AND THEY WOULD OF COURSE BE TALKING AGAIN AT THE RCD SUMMIT IN APRIL. (I DID NOT MENTION MY FEAR THAT THE TURKS MIGHT WANT TO BE ON A BETTER FOOTING WITH US BILATERALLY BEFORE MAKING UP THEIR MINDS SINCE I, OF COURSE, DON'T REALLY KNOW THAT.

12. THINKING OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE HAD IN CENTO ON POLITICAL

GUIDANCE ABOUT "IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY" I ASKED IF THEY WERE THINKING OF USING THE VAGUE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY IN THIS REGARD IN THE ALLIANCE THEY HAD IN MIND. BHUTTO

GOT THE POINT VERY QUICKLY, AND WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT THERE WAS NO SUBTERFUGE INVOLVED IN THIS AT ALL AS REGARDS THE INDIAN QUESTION. HE SAID HE HAD THOUGHT OF FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE SOVIET-INDIAN FRIENDSHIP AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD AS THIS WOULD MAKE IT A LITTLE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO RAISE HELL, WHICH THEY SURELY WOULD DO AT LEAST FROM A PROGPAGANDA POINT OF VIEW.

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BHUTTO SAID THERE COULD BE REALLY NO DOUBT THAT THE PURPOSE OF WHAT HE WAS SUGGESTING WAS DEFENSIVE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. OTHERWISE HE SAID IT WOULD FALL ON ITS OWN WEIGHT. THE TURKS, FOR INTANCE, MUST KNOW THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE WAS NOT TO TRY TO INVOLVE FAR AWAY IRAN AND PAKISTAN IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AGAINST GREECE. LIKEWISE THE TURKS AND IRAN WOULD NOT BUY GETTING INTO THIS KIND OF ARRANGEMENT IF IT SIMPLY MEANT SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN AGAINST INDIA.

13. BHUTTO WONDERED WHAT OUR REACTION WOULD REALLY BE. I TOLD HIM AS A DIPLOMAT I PRESUMED OUR FIRST COMMENT WOULD BE THAT WE WOULD WANT THE THREENATIONS CONCERNED TO CONSIDER FIRST AND FOREMOST WHATTHEY THOUGHT WAS THE BEST THING FOR THEM. HE SMILED AND SAID HE OF COURSE REALIZED THAT BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT WE REALLY FELT ABOUT THIS. I SAID I SUPPOSE HE MEANT BEFORE THEIR MEETINGS IN APRIL AND REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW MUCH QUICKER THAN THAT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM I WOULD ENDEAVOR TO FIND OUT.

14. COMMENT: THIS IS FAR TOO FUNDAMENTAL FOR ANY QUICK RECOMMENDATIONS ON MY PART. IF THE SHAH IS AS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THIS AS BHUTTO SEEMS TO BE, IT WOULD SEEM TO BE REASON FOR SERIOUS STUDY IN WASHINGTON. MY OWN INITIAL REACTION IS THAT IF PROPERLY FORMULATED AND PUBLICIZED THE TREATY MIGHT BE A USEFUL ELEMENT PROMOTING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY AS IT SPRINGS FROM LOCAL INITIATIVE (THUS AVOIDING MANY OF THE PITFALLS WHICH BEDEVILED CENTO) AND INVOLVES IN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT A POWER WHOSE MAJOR CONCERN APPEARS TO BE THE MAINTENANCE OF AREA STATUS QUO. I BELIEVE THAT IN ANY EVENT WE OWE BHUTTO OUR APPRAISAL OF HIS CONCEPT, THOUGH WITH THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF UNDER-WRITING IT. I WOULD URGE THAT WE PASS ON TO HIM AT LEAST OUR TENTATIVE IMPRESSIONS BEFORE THE RCD SUMMIT.

15. YOU MAY WANT TO REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO TEHRAN AND ANKARA.
BYROADE

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